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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16636

-vsWILLIAM LUIS FORSYTH,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appeal from conviction of four counts of theft
by deception, second degree felonies in violation of Utah
Code Annotated§ 76-6-405 (1953, as amended).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendant was tried by a jury on June 25, 26, and
27, 1979 before the Honorable George E. Ballif of the Fourth
Judicial District Court, Provo, Utah County.

The jury

returned a verdict of guilty on the four counts of the
information on June 27, 1979.
the jury's verdict.

The defendant appeals from

(Upon State's motion, Count V of the

information was dismissed.)
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the convictions
in the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant was the founder and president of Great
Outdoors, Incorporated,

(hereafter GOI), a Utah Corporation,

which had as its purpose the construction of a large spa
in Orem, at 250 West Center Street.

The proposed spa was

to contain, among other things, a dance floor, archery
range, swimming pools, and weight lifting rooms.

Defendant

actively solicited investors for the spa project to provide
needed capital.
Defendant told investors that for $5,000.00
investment, they would have an interest in the large spa
and a life time membership.

He further told them that the

large spa was to be financed through the completion of and
sale of membership in a smaller spa in Orem, Utah, at 1650
East South State Street.
During the solicitations of investors, defendant

·
· 1 misrepresentations,
·
·
·
s1· ste"i. I
knowingly
mad e several materia
incon

promises and mutually exclusive claims to investors.
For example, Benjamin De Hoyos, James Broadbent,
Wayne Turley, and Ralph Ladle were told by defendant that
their investment was totally secured by the large spa proper::
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site at 250 West Center Street.

De Hoyos testified that

defendant told him that the land was owned by GOI free and
clear and was sure collateral for any investments (Tr. 122).
De Hoyos relied on these representations in making his
investment (Tr. 103,105).

Defendant told Broadbent that

he (defendant) owned the Center Street property.

Broadbent,

on the basis of this representation, felt secure in his
investment in the company (Tr. 138,139).

Turley was told

by defendant that the Center Street property was the ace
in the hole, and that there was enough money wrapped up in
the property to guarantee the return of any money to
investors.

Turley felt that his investment was a sure

thing since defendant represented it as being backed up
with all that land (Tr. 172).

Ladle testified that defendant

represented the Center Street property as being the security
for Ladle's investment (Tr. 174).
The evidence., contrary to defendant's representations,
was that the Center Street property was neither owned free
and clear, nor did defendant or Great Outdoors, Incorporated
have sufficient equity in the property to guarantee the
return of the money of investors.

The Center Street property

was foreclosed on after defendant had paid only $34,000.00
of the principal owing on the property (Tr. 223,224).
Despite the more than $182,000.00 received by the defendant
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from investors,

(Exh. 58).

Defendant defaulted on two

relatively small payments on the property and left
construction projects on the property unfinished (Tr.

224~

228).
Defendant made representations to prospective
investors that only $50,000.00 was needed to complete the
small spa project, that there would be only ten investors
investing $5,000.00 each, and that the money was to be used
to finish the smaller spa project.

Ivan Park, who invested

$5,000.00 in GOI as early as May, 1973, testified that at
that time defendant named "seven or eight, or some such
number" of investors (Tr. 304).

After defendant named

seven or eight, at least nine people paid monies to defendant,
Helen Evans invested $12,000.00 in June, 1973 (Tr. 256);
Ladle invested in September, 1973 (Tr. 273); Brown invested
in 1973

(Tr. 280-283); Taylor invested in February, 1974

(Tr. 314,315), as did Brothers
victims.

(Tr. 346), and the four

Significantly, the defendant first told the four

,
1

victims listed in the information - De Hoyos, Uzelac, Turley,

1

and Broadbent - that there were only to be ten investors ata
total of $5 O, O00. OO after Park, the "seven or eight" investo::,
mentioned to Park, Evans, Ladle, Brown Taylor and Brothers
had invested.

(T. r 31, 34, 161, 167, 168) .

Defendant even told

De Hoyos, as late as May, 197 4, that De Hoyos was the seventr.'
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:,

person to invest (Tr. 100).

Defendant's Exhibit 58 revealed

that, in fact, there were over one hundred investors who
had invested $182,625.00 in defendant's corporation.

(Exh.

58, p.l, line 26).
Although defendant told investors GOI only needed
$50,000.00 the following debts,known by defendant,were proven
to be owed by GOI prior to May, 1974:
date debt payable

amount

to whom payable

1 January 1974

$20,000

due on the contract on the
land for the large spa (Tr.
219-222)

30 January 1974

$ 5,000

due Wayne Brown (Tr. 287
Exhibit 37

30 January 1974

$ 5,000

due Ralph Ladle (Tr. 271,
275, 276, Exhibits 15,16)

30 January 1974

$ 8,500

due Ivan Park (Tr. 305,306
Exhibit 451)

30 January 1974

$13,496

due on large spa (Tr. 226228)

16 April 1974

$12,000

due Helen Evans (Tr. 257-259,
262, Exhibit 31)

TOTAL -

I

$63,996

In addition, defendant knew GOI owed significant sums of
money to sub contractors who had worked on the small spa
property.

Eldon Adams, who leased property to defendant

for the small spa, gave testimony that he (Adams) paid over
$34,000 to persons who had done work on the small spa property
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while defendant had control of the property under the
lease (Tr. 359-364).

Adams subsequently completed the

work on the small spa for a total cost of $193,000 (Tr.
380-381) .
Defendant represented to many investors, both
victims in the information and others, that they would
receive a rapid return on their investment.

Park, who

invested in May, 1973, was promised his money back in a
maximum of six months (Tr. 302,303).

Taylor, who invested

in February, 1974, was promised that he would be the first
to get his money back, that his money would be returned
within three months, and that this offer would not be
made to anyone else (Tr. 314-319) .

Helen Evans, who invested

in June, 1973, was to have been paid back by the first of
January, 1974.

Defendant promised in writing to pay her

$3,000.00 in each of the months of May, June, July, and
August, 1974 (Tr. 262, Exh. 32).

Evans never received her

money back (Tr. 256, 259, 260, 262, 263).

De Hoyos was

promised his money back in four months (Tr. 103).

Defendant

promised Uzelac and Turley their money back in one year's
time (Tr. 35, 168).

Terry was to receive his return of

investment within three or four months (Tr. 347).

The

victims in the information did not receive their money back.
Defendant made mutually exclusive representations
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concerning enterprises.

Defendant told De Hoyos that GOI,

the company involved with the spas, was the parent Company
and owner of Build Estate, Incorporated (Tr. 127-129).
Thorell, who was also investing in the spas, was told by
the defendant to make his check payable to Build Estate
(Tr. 311).

Defendant told several of the other investors,

including Thorell and Evans, that they were investing in
Build Estate, Incorporated,_ the parent company which owned
GOI and which was to draw income from GOI (Tr. 265, 266,
311).

For prior rulings in this case see State v. Forsyth,

560 P.2d 337

(Utah 1977); and State v. Forsyth,

587 P.2d

1387 (Utah 1978).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TESTIMONY OF INVESTORS OTHER THAN THOSE
VICTIMS LISTED IN THE INFORMATION WAS
PROPERLY ADMITTED UNDER RULE 55 OF THE
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE
DEFENDANT'S INTENT, PREPARATION, PLA.~,
KNOWLEDGE, SCHEME OF OPERATIONS, AND
ABSENCE OF MISTAKE.
Although evidence of crimes committed by the
defendant other than those covered in the immediate prosecution
is generally inadmissible, Utah rules and legal precedent
specifically allow certain logical and reasonable exceptions.
Rule 55, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
Su~ject to Rule 47, evidence that
a person committed a crime or civil
wrong on a specific occasion, is
inadmissible to prove his disposition
to commit crime or civil wrong as the
basis for an inference that he
committed another crime or civil wrong
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on another specified occasion but,
subject to Rule 45 and 48, such evidence
is admissible when relevant to prove
some other material fact including absence
of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or
identity.
(Emphasis added.)

See also State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d 1232

(Utah 1975).
This general principle of evidence was explained by
the court in State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772
(1969):
Concededly, evidence of other crimes
is not admissible if the purpose is to
disgrace the defendant as a person of evil
character with a propensity to commit crime
and thus likely to have committed the crime
charged. However, if the evidence has
relevancy to explain the circumstances
surrounding the instant crime, it is
admissible for that purpose; and the fact
that it may tend to connect the defendant
with another crime will not render it
incompetent.
451 P.2d at 775.
Rule 55, Utah Rules of Evidence allows evidence
of other crimes or civil wrongs to show not only "absence
of mistake or accident, motive

intent

. . plan,

knowledge," but to prove "some other material fact . .
Thus, other crimes may be used to show anything which
has a legitimate evidentiary purpose other than merely
to discredit the defendant.

The following Utah

criminal cases are illustrative of the types of
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evidence which may be properly admitted under Rule 55:
State v. Schieving, supra, evidence of heavy
indebtedness and two garnishments admitted to show motive
and intent for embezzlement.
State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 (Utah 1977),
evidence of other sales proceeds having been taken by
appellant was admissible to establish a common plan or a
scheme and to show a motive.
State v. Baran, 25 Utah 2d 16 (1970), evidence
of several other crimes committed by the defendant on an
evening spree admitted to "explain the circumstances
surrounding the instant crime."

Id. at 19.

State v. Mason, 530 P.2d 795 (Utah 1977),
defendant's use of heroin on the day in question admissible
to determine her mental condition at the time she testifies,
even though the charge is for theft.
State v. Lopez, supra, property taken from
defendant's car which came from an unrelated crime admitted
"to explain the circumstances surrounding the instant crime."
Id. at 260.
State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 321, 495 P.2d 1265
(1972), prior drug· contacts shown to explain the circumstances
surrounding the crime and to show a state of mind of the
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defendant.
State v. Maestas, 560 P.2d 343 (Utah 1977),
evidence of a robbery committed a few days before the
homicide admissible to show the motive for the homicide,
and intent on the part of the defendant.
State v. Neal, 254 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1953),
four robberies in California for which the defendant was
not convicted admissible to establish that the defendant
was facing a series of prosecutions in Utah and California
and thereby supplied a strong motive for trying to shoot his
way to freedom.
State v. VanDyke, 589 P.2d 764 (Utah 1978),
evidence of the defendant's robbing several other smaller
places admissible to show preparation and plan.
State v. Sharp, No. 15915 (Utah, April 2, 1979),
evidence of entry into other cabins admissible to show

pl~

,

and the activities of the defendant concerning the crime
charged.
State v. Daniels, No. 15509 (Utah, Sept. 13, 1978),
evidence that the defendant stole gasoline was relevant to
explain the circumstances surrounding the crime for which
he was charged.
State v. Brown, 577 P.2d 135 (Utah 1978), evidence
of theft of an automobile, sale of a stolen automobile, and
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,
an attempt to conceal the crimes by placing parts in a
wrecked automobile was admissible on a separate charge to
show intent and knowledge and also to reveal a modus operandi.
See also State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978);
State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977); State v. Boone,
581 P.2d 405 (Utah 1978).
Defendant says the testimony of the investors other
than the victims was improperly admitted.

Respondent asserts

that the testimony of the other investors reveals substantial
relevant misrepresentations made by the defendant in perpetration
of a common plan or scheme, completes the picture of the
entire investment scheme rather than just the relatively small
part played by the victims, and shows the entire circumstances
under which the defendant was operating at the time he spoke
to the victims.

See Facts, supra.

Late in the scheme, defendant asserted that no more
than ten investors would be allowed to participate, at $5,000.00
each.

The testimony of victims other than those named in the

information showed more than ten investors had already
participated.

Specifically, Parks was told by defendant of

seven or eight investors at the time he invested, in May,
1973 (Tr. 304).

After Park was told that there were already

seven or eight other investors, additional persons invested
in the corporation, including Evans, Ladle, Brown, Taylor,
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and Brothers.

After that, the defendant represented to the

victims, De Hoyos, Uzelac, Turley, and Broadbent, that
there were only to be ten partnerships in total.
Although in April, 1974, defendant and GO! owed
$63,996.00--on the large spa property, to investors, and for
i

work done on the large spa property--and an additional $34,00u.I
for work done on the small spa property, and although $193,00u.
was needed to complete the small spa, defendant maintained,
as late as May, 1974, that only $50,000.00 was necessary to
complete the small spa project, that the small spa would pay
for the large spa completely, and that there were, at that
time, seven out of ten investors who had invested their
money.

$50,000.00 would not have even paid the current,

known obligations of GOI, let alone result in completion of
the small spa and the large spa.
Testimony of other investors showed that defendant
misrepresented the ownership of the large spa property at
250 West Center Street in Orem to victims and other investors,
alike, telling them that he owned the property free and
clear and held it as collateral to pay investors, and that
enough money was wrapped up in the property to guarantee
the return of any and all investments.

Later testimony

established that the defendant did not own the property
free and clear, nor did he have sufficient equity to
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guarantee the return of investments.

The testimony of

other investors better showed the amounts of equity in
the property which would have been necessary, but which
was not available, to collateralize investor and victim's
moneys.
Testimony of other investors revealed that defendant
promised investors a rapid return of their investment, and
that he made conflicting representations as to who would
get his money back first.

Park, who invested in May, 1973,

was to get his money back in six months from the time of
investment, yet defendant promised Taylor, who invested in
February, 1974, that Taylor was to be the first to get his
money back.

At that time, in February, 1974, defendant

already owed substantial sums of money to Park, Ladle, and
Brown (see chart of defendant's debts, p. 5, supra).

Yet

defendant continued to make representations to both victims
and other investors alike that they would receive a rapid
return on their investment.
Evidence of investments by investors other than
the victims listed in the information showed that defendant
misrepresented the appropriate business of the company.

He

told some investors that Build Estate, Incorporated was the
parent company of GOI, that Build Estate owned the spas and
would receive a portion of anything that GOI made.

However,

De Hoyos and Broadbent, two of the named victims, were told
that GOI was the parent company.

See Facts.

Defendant did not pay for the work on the small spa
with the investment of victims and other investors as he
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represented that he would.

He did not own the large spa

property outright, nor did he own equity in it sufficient
to guarantee the return of the money to the victims, let
.

•·

alone other investors .
In State v. Schieving, supra,

(which appellant

mis-cites as Olson v. Swapp, 535 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1975)),
this Court set the standard for receiving evidence of
a common plan or scheme:
• • • evidence of another crime is
admissible . . • to show a common
scheme or plan embracing commission
of similar crimes so related to each
other that the proof of one tends to
establish the crime for which the
defendant is on trial.
535 P.2d at
1233.
The testimony of investors other than the victims
named in the information did meet this Court's standard.
Such testimony corroborated the testimony of the victims
in great detail, and the combined testimony of victims
and other investors showed the modus operandi of the defendan:
I

The common scheme of the defendant was to make people believe I
that there were only two or three openings left for investors,!
take as much money from as many people as possible, ostensibly
to invest in a small spa, expenses for which were not paid.
To that end, defendant made many significant representations
to both the victims and other investors, all of which are
extremely relevant.

The fact that he made similar and
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sometimes exactly the same false statements to other
investors as well as to the victims helps to establish
that proof of a common scheme necessary for a proper
determination by the jury.

In State v. Tuggle, 28 Utah 2d 284, 501 P.2d
636 (1972), this Court pointed out that "ordinarily the
admissibility of evidence is for the trial court, and in
the absence of an abuse of discretion on the part of the
court, the ruling will not be disturbed on appeal."
(Id. at 637).

This Court has further noted, in State v.

Lopez, supra, that "such harm as there may be in receiving
evidence concerning another crime is to be weighed against
the necessity of full inquiry into the facts relating to
the issues."

(451 P.2d at 775).

In the present case the trial judge exercised
sound discretion in admitting the evidence of investors
other than the victims.

He was given ample opportunity

to weigh and consider the probative value of the evidence,
and he allowed it in.

Clearly, in his view, the importance

of the evidence in explaining the situation and putting
the entire matter ·before the jury outweighed any prejudicial
effect it may have had upon the jury.

In the absence of any

clear showing of an abuse of discretion, the trial judge's
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ruling on this matter should stand.
It is questionable whether or not the evidence of
other investors even fits the category of other crimes or
other civil wrongs according to defendant's theory of the
case.

The defendant's defense was that he was engaged in

a normal business operation which attempted to succeed but
which legitimately failed.

Defendant argues the legitimacy

of a business on one hand and at the same time alleges that
evidence of that business is not admissible because it was
a crime.

Representations, conversations, and transactions

in defendant's declared legitimate attempt at business
cannot be simultaneously a crime.
CONCLUSION

The evidence claimed by defendant to be erroneously
admitted was not admitted for the purpose of demonstrating
the accused's evil nature or character, or his propensity to

.

comrni t a crime, but was admitted for the permissible purpose
of explaining the circumstances surrounding the crime in
order to deI!lonstrate intent, preparation, plan and common
scheme of operation.

These are legitimate reasons for the

introduction of the evidence and the fact that the evidence
tends to show that the appellant had cornrni tted other crimes
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does not render the evidence incompetent.
For these reasons, the State urges this Court
to uphold the verdict of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of
January, 1981.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
ROBERT R. WALLACE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed two copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Mr. Stephen R. Madsen,
Attorney for Appellant, 381 West 2230 North, Suite 201,
Provo, Utah 84601, this 27th day of January, 1981.
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